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THE FEENEY AMENDMENT AND THE
CONTINUING RISE OF PROSECUTORIAL
POWER TO PLEA BARGAIN
STEPHANOS BIBAS*
Congress has come close to a drive-by rewrite of sentencing law, and a
sentencing revolution may still be in the works. On April 10, 2003,
Congress passed the PROTECT bill (popularly known as Amber Alert),
which creates a national notification system for child kidnappings. On
March 26, while the bill was pending, the House of Representatives passed
the Feeney Amendment to the bill.1 The original amendment was an
unprecedented attempt by Congress to rewrite the Sentencing Guidelines by
itself without the input or expertise of the Sentencing Commission. The
House-Senate Conference Committee narrowed the amendment, limiting
many of its changes to child pornography and child sex cases. The revised
amendment nonetheless changes the Sentencing Guidelines substantially,
and it instructs the Sentencing Commission to make many more changes
within the next six months. The likely result is many fewer Guideline
departures, less judicial discretion, and more prosecutorial control. The
losers are defendants and judges, and the winners are prosecutors.
Prosecutorial leverage to plea bargain will be at an all-time high, resulting
in fewer trials, more bargains, and higher sentences. Judges used to check
prosecutorial harshness, but now they are increasingly powerless unless
prosecutors deign to grant leniency.
I. THE SCOPE OF THE REVISED FEENEY AMENDMENT

The enacted version of the Feeney Amendment is substantially
narrower than the original proposal. Among other changes, the original
amendment would have eliminated all unenumerated downward departures
. Associate Professor, University of Iowa College of Law; former Assistant
U.S.
Attorney, Criminal Division, U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York
(bibas@philo.org). B.A., Columbia; B.A., M.A., Oxford; J.D., Yale. I am grateful to Doug
Berman for his advice and insights on this topic.
1 The amendment is named after its sponsor, Representative Tom Feeney, a Florida
Republican.
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and all downward departures for family ties, diminished capacity, aberrant
behavior, educational or vocational skills, mental or emotional conditions,
employment record, good works, or overstated criminal history.2 A bevy of
defense lawyers, law professors, current and former Sentencing
Commissioners, the President of the American Bar Association, Chief
Justice Rehnquist, and others wrote to Congress opposing the amendment.3
Perhaps as a result of these protests, the House-Senate Conference
Committee narrowed the amendment. The enacted bill limits the changes
described above to crimes involving pornography, sexual abuse, child sex,
and child kidnapping and trafficking.4 It also raises penalties for child
pornography and child sex abuse.'
Nonetheless, the Feeney Amendment reaches well beyond these
particular crimes. Its changes include the following:
Appellate review. The revised amendment overturns Koon v. United
States,6 substituting de novo appellate review for Koon's abuse-ofdiscretion standard. 7 It also bars district courts whose departures have been
reversed on appeal from giving a new reason to depart again on remand.8
Reporting requirements. The amendment requires the Sentencing
Commission to collect and report more data on departures, and it requires
the Department of Justice to report its efforts to oppose unwarranted
departures. 9
Prosecutorial control over departures. The amendment makes a
prosecutorial motion a prerequisite for a three-level reduction for
acceptance of responsibility.' It also instructs the Sentencing Commission
to authorize four-level "fast-track" downward departures in illegal-reentry
immigration cases upon motion of the prosecutor."

H. Amend. 19 to H.R. 1104, 108th Cong. (2003).
Save Downward Departures, available at http://www.nacdl.org/
departures (last visited Feb. 3, 2004) (collecting correspondence).
4 PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(a), (b), 117 Stat. 650, 667-68 (2003)
(codified as amended at scattered statutes of 18 U.S.C.A. & 28 U.S.C.A.) (limiting
departures to those recognized in chapter 5K and so excluding departures listed only in
chapter 5H).
IId. § 40 1(i), 117 Stat. at 672-73.
6 518 U.S. 81, 96-99 (1996).
7 PROTECT Act § 401(d), 117 Stat. at 670-71. The amendment does, however, retain
deferential review of the extent of departures that are otherwise justified. Id.
8 Id. § 401(e), 117 Stat. at 671.
9 Id. § 401(h), (I), 117 Stat. at 672, 674.
'o Id. § 401(g), 117 Stat. at 671.
, Id. § 401(m)(2)(B), 117 Stat. at 675.
2

3 See NACDL,

2004]

PROSECUTORIAL POWER TO PLEA BARGAIN

Directions to the Sentencing Commission to reduce downward
departures. More generally, the amendment instructs the Sentencing
Commission to amend the Guidelines within 180 days "to ensure that the
incidence of downward departures are [sic] substantially reduced., 12 It
forbids the Sentencing Commission ever to amend the acceptance-ofresponsibility provision above or to reduce the increased penalties for child
pornography and child sex abuse. 3 It imposes a two-year moratorium on
Guideline amendments that create new downward departure grounds or
loosen the amendment's restrictions on grounds for departure.14 It makes
its amendments effective immediately, regardless of whether the Sentencing
Finally, the
Commission has yet issued conforming amendments. 5
amendment caps the6 number of federal judges on the Sentencing
Commission at three.'
The first thing to note about these amendments is their scope.
Congress has cut back significantly on the changes envisioned in the
original Feeney Amendment. Nonetheless, this package of changes affects
everything from the structure of the Sentencing Commission to the standard
of review to the roles of prosecutors to the acceptable grounds for
departures. Though Congress packaged the amendment as part of a childprotection bill, its reach and import are far broader.
II. SHIFTING POWER FROM DISTRICT JUDGES TO PROSECUTORS

The second important point to note is the target of the amendment:
unilateral judicial downward departures. Many of its provisions apply
asymmetrically to restrict downward but not upward departures. For
example, the amendment eliminates downward departures for child crimes
and sex offenses based on unenumerated grounds (except for cooperators)
but preserves upward departures on unenumerated grounds.' 7 It places a
two-year moratorium on the creation of new downward-departure grounds
but not upward-departure grounds.' 8 It allows the Sentencing Commission
to amend the new child-pornography and child-sex-abuse guidelines so long
as it never lowers sentences for these crimes.' 9 It specifically requires the

12 Id. § 401(m)(2)(A), 117 Stat. at 675.
13 Id. § 401(j)(3), (4), 117 Stat. at 673.

Id. § 401(j)(2), 117 Stat. at 673.
's Id. § 401(j)(1), (5), 117 Stat. at 673-74.
16 Id. § 401(n)(1), 117 Stat. at 676.
17Id. § 401(a)(2), 117 Stat. at 667.
"8Id. § 401(j)(2), 117 Stat. at 673.
19 Id. § 401(j)(3), 117 Stat. at 673.
14
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Attorney General to report unsupported downward departures. 20 It requires
the Sentencing Commission to amend the Guidelines so as to "substantially
reduc[e]" the frequency of downward departures. 21 And it restricts
departures for aberrant behavior, family responsibilities, community ties,
capacity, all of which would serve only to mitigate
and diminished
22
sentences.
This one-way skew is not necessarily bad. Congress was simply
responding to the huge number of downward departures, as compared with
a minuscule number of upward departures. In fiscal year 2001, only sixtyfour percent of defendants were sentenced within the applicable range.
17.1% received downward departures for substantial assistance, and 18.3%
received other downward departures. In contrast, only. 0.6% received
upward departures. 23
Some of this judicial skew toward leniency may be an illusion created
by the structure of the Guidelines. Chapter Three of the Guidelines
contains a series of general adjustments to offense levels. This chapter
creates upward adjustments for vulnerable victims, hate crimes, official
victims, restraint of victims, terrorism, large role in the offense, abuse of
position of trust, use of special skill, use of a minor to commit a crime,
obstruction of justice, and reckless endangerment during flight.24

The

chapter contains only two downward adjustments, namely reductions for a
minor role in the offense and acceptance of responsibility.2 5 In other words,
many aggravating factors are adjustments that are built into the applicable
guideline range, whereas most mitigating factors are left to the departure
process. This asymmetry partially explains why downward departures are
more common.
Nevertheless, it is fair to say that judges stretch much more often in
favor of leniency. Many judges believe the Sentencing Guidelines are too
harsh and want to soften penalties they dislike. In addition to judicial
preferences, systemic forces discourage upward departures and encourage
downward departures. Judges fear that if they depart upwards, defendants
will almost certainly appeal the departure (using their right to free
appointed counsel on appeal). But if they depart downward, Assistant U.S.
20 Id. § 401(I), 117 Stat. at 674.
21
22

Id. § 401(m)(2)(A), 117 Stat. at 675.
Id. § 401(b)(2), 117 Stat. at 668.

23 U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2001 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS,

Figure G (2002) [hereinafter FEDERAL SENTENCING
24

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

STATISTICS].

§§ 3A1. 1-4, 3B .1, 3B 1.3-4, 3C1.1-2 (2002)

[hereinafter GUIDELINES MANUAL].
25 Id. §§ 3B1.2, 3E1.1. 1am grateful to Doug Berman for the point made in the text.
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Attorneys may be too busy to bother writing appellate briefs, particularly if
the departure is modest.26 Defendants have incentives to fight for the
lowest possible sentence, whereas prosecutors may be pushing not to
maximize sentences but rather to dispose of their dockets efficiently. Thus,
prosecutors may acquiesce in (or at least not vigorously oppose) many
departures simply to get rid of cases by plea bargain, without the burden of
a trial.27 In other words, the adversary system gives defense counsel strong
incentives to police upward departures, so district courts risk appellate
reversal if they dare to depart upward. But because prosecutors have no
personal stake in stiff sentences and can lessen their workloads by agreeing
to lighter dispositions, they have less incentive to police downward
departures. District judges, knowing this, are less wary of departing
downward than upward, leading to the massive asymmetry described above.
It is no surprise, then, that Congress is stepping in to counteract these
structural forces and to trump judicial leniency by policing downward but
not upward departures. One can dispute the merits of Congress's policy,
but its desire to regulate departures is at least understandable.
But Congress did not try to regulate all downward departures. If
Congress were seriously concerned about policing the systemic skew
toward leniency, it would also have addressed the single largest class of
downward departures: substantial assistance to the government under
section 5K1 .1.28 As noted above, substantial-assistance departures account
for almost half of all departures and occur in more than one-sixth of all
sentences. 29 In several districts, the rate exceeds forty percent of all
sentences. 30 Though these departures are powerful tools for cracking
criminal organizations' codes of silence, they carry serious costs:
undercutting deserved punishment, producing inequality and disparities,
and sometimes inducing perjury.3 ' It is hard to believe that these departures
are essential in anywhere near one-sixth of all sentences. 2 Yet the Feeney

26

When I was a prosecutor in the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of

New York, I nicknamed this common practice "flying under the [Second Circuit's] radar."
27 See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L.
REV. (forthcoming June 2004).
28 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 24, § 5Kl.I.
29 See supra text accompanying note 23.
30 FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS,

supra note 23, at 53-55 tbl.26.
C. Richman, Cooperating Defendants: The Costs and Benefits of
PurchasingInformationfrom Scoundrels, 8 FED. SENTENCING REP. 292 (1996).
32 See id. at 293-94 (discussing prosecutors' incentives to "overbuy" cooperation to
buttress cases); Ian Weinstein, Regulating the Market for Snitches, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 563,
613-15 (1999) (noting that cooperation benefits do not seem proportioned to assistance
rendered, but are used by prosecutors to moderate sentences and achieve other aims).
31 See Daniel
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Amendment leaves these untouched. The Sentencing Commission might
address substantial-assistance departures as part of reducing departure rates,
but that is not the focus of the amendment.
The amendment's aim is not so much to limit departures overall as it is
to limit judges' unilateral discretion to depart. Departures on motion of the
prosecutor are privileged, while departures on the judge's own initiative are
discouraged.
For example, substantial-assistance departures on the
prosecutor's motion are exempt from the ban on unenumerated departures
and from the required reports to Congress.33 Prosecutors' motions are now
prerequisites for the third level of reduction for acceptance of
responsibility.3 4 And a prosecutorial motion pursuant to a Department of
Justice program is explicitly a prerequisite for fast-track departures in
illegal-reentry immigration cases. 35 True, fast-track departures now require
the U.S. Attorney and the Attorney General to implement and approve a
program of departures. This supervisory involvement and promulgation of
policies should guide and constrain line prosecutors somewhat, ensuring
more consistency. Nevertheless, the power remains in prosecutors' hands.
Congress should do more than tackle only one half of the departure
problem. The criminal justice system operates like a toothpaste tube, and
departures that are squeezed out of the judge's end of the tube will wind up
in the prosecutor's domain. This hydraulic pressure means that departures
will still exist, but they will now occur more often on prosecutors' terms. It
used to be that defendants could try to strike bargains with judges and
prosecutors. If prosecutors were amenable to dealing, defendants would
enter plea bargains with them. If prosecutors insisted on overly harsh
sentences, however, judges had the power to undercut them. Defendants
could plead guilty without plea agreements and judges could signal that
they would give more reasonable sentences than prosecutors would. This
judicial power tempered and balanced prosecutors' power. Knowing that
judges could moderate excessive sentences, prosecutors had strong
incentives to strike reasonable deals. Judges could check and balance
prosecutors, limiting their bargaining power. Prosecutors thus struck
reasonable plea bargains in the shadow of the outcome that judges would
have reached had there been no plea bargain.36

3 PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(a)(2), (1)(2)(A), 117 Stat. 650, 667, 674
(2003).
34 Id. § 401 (g), 117 Stat. at 67 1.
35 Id. § 401(m)(2)(B), 117 Stat. at 675.
36 See Stephanos Bibas, JudicialFact-Findingand Sentence Enhancements in a World of
Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE L.J. 1097, 1155-56, 1158-60 (2001).
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More and more, judges have less power to deal and prosecutors have
more. 3 ' The Feeney Amendment is the latest step in this trend. The real
effect of the Feeney Amendment is not to get rid of departures but to raise
Departures will still happen with prosecutors'
the price of them.
connivance: If a prosecutor acquiesces, or opposes a departure with a nod
and a wink to a judge, the judge can depart downward confident that there
will be no appeal to stop him. The same is true if a prosecutor authorizes a
substantial-assistance or fast-track departure. And the same is true if the
prosecutor and defense counsel connive to shade the facts to conceal their
evasion of the Guidelines; probation officers may or may not check this
subterfuge. But if a prosecutor opposes a departure, the judge now has
much less room to maneuver and much more fear of appellate reversal. In
fairness, I must note that the Feeney Amendment does try to check
prosecutorial leniency through Department of Justice procedures and
improved reporting of departures.38 But this is a hopeless task, because
prosecutors are imperfect guardians of Congress's desire for stiff sentences.
And the price of stiff sentences is less discretion to tailor punishment to
crime and criminal, and all of that discretion now in the hands of one actor
rather than two. The potential for arbitrariness and unfairness is greater
because the checks and balances are weaker.
Interestingly, the one bright spot in this picture is the much-maligned
Attorney General. On July 28, 2003, Attorney General John Ashcroft
circulated a memorandum to all federal prosecutors on complying with the
Feeney Amendment. The media have blamed Ashcroft for ordering
prosecutors to report certain adverse sentencing decisions to the Department
of Justice in Washington.3 9 This reporting, however, is required by the
Feeney Amendment, and Ashcroft is simply preparing to comply with the
statute. 40 The media have largely ignored the other half of Ashcroft's
memorandum, which clamps down on prosecutorial manipulation of facts
and acquiescence in departures. 4' And the many critics of Ashcroft's new
restrictions on plea bargaining fail to see how they actually improve the
37 See Stephanos Bibas, How Apprendi Affects Institutional Allocations of Power, 87
IOWA

L. REv. 465, 470-74 (2002).

31 PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(1), 117 Stat. 650, 674 (2003).
39 See, e.g., Justice Kennedy Speaks Out, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2003, at A16 (editorial)

("Attorney General John Ashcroft has announced plans to track individual judges'
sentencing records, an intimidating move that critics are calling a judicial blacklist.").
40 S. 151, 108th Cong., § 401(1) (2003) (enacted).
41 Memorandum from Attorney General John Ashcroft to All Federal Prosecutors,
Department Policies and Procedures Concerning Sentencing Recommendations and
Sentencing Appeals (July 28, 2003), available at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf
/legislation/ci03 32?OpenDocument (last visited Feb. 16, 2004).
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balance of power.42 By limiting charge bargaining, he is limiting line
prosecutors' arbitrariness and partially offsetting the Feeney Amendment's
lopsidedness.
Under the Feeney Amendment, trial judges also lose power relative to
appellate courts. By abrogating Koon,43 Congress has authorized more
searching appellate review of aberrant trial-court rulings. This may not be a
bad thing: appellate courts are better positioned to ensure consistency, and
other areas of federal law use de novo review for the application of law to
fact. 44 Though there are arguments for trial-court discretion, Congress may
not trust district judges given their high departure rates and hostility to the
Guidelines. The net result is that trial judges are constrained by fear that
prosecutors and appellate courts will combine to reverse downward
departures.
One can question how much the standard of review matters in practice.
Though Koon purported to loosen the standard of review, there is
conflicting evidence about whether the result has been many more
departures.4a Perhaps, a legal realist might say, the wording of the review
42

Memorandum from Attorney General John Ashcroft to All Federal Prosecutors,

Department Policy Concerning Charging Criminal Offenses, Disposition of Charges, and
Sentencing (Sept. 22, 2003), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/doj/
ashcroft92203chrgmem.pdf. This memorandum does not, however, restrict fast-track or
substantial-assistance departures, and it allows some charge bargaining over statutory
enhancements such as 21 U.S.C. § 851 (prior felony information in drug cases) and 18
U.S.C. § 924(c) (using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a violent crime or drug
trafficking).
43 Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996).
44 See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 336-37 n.10 (1998) (prescribing de
novo review of the application of the Excessive Fines Clause's gross-disproportionality test
to the facts); Omelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696-97, 699 (1996) (prescribing do
novo review of the application of the Fourth Amendment's standards for reasonable
suspicion and probable cause to the facts); see also Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, Inc.,
466 U.S. 485, 501 n.17 (1984) (prescribing "independent judgment" of appellate court in
reviewing the application of defamation law's actual-malice test to the facts); Lumber &
Wood Prods., Inc. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 807 F.2d 916, 918 (11th Cir. 1987)
(prescribing de novo review of the construction and application of an insurance policy to the
facts); Mayors v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 785 F.2d 757, 759 (9th Cir. 1986)
(prescribing de novo review of application of tax law to the facts).
45 One study found that departures did not increase significantly in the year after Koon
was decided. Paul J. Hofer et al., DepartureRates and Reasons after Koon v. United States,
9 FED. SENTENCING REP. 284, 285 fig. 1 (1997). On the other hand, since then individual
districts have displayed marked jumps in their rates of non-substantial-assistance departures
after Koon. The District of Connecticut's departure rate rose from 29.8% to 33.8%. The
Eastern District of New York's departure rate rose from 24.7% to 28.4%. The District of
Vermont's departure rate increased from 11.0% to 23.4%. The Eastern District of
Washington's departure rate jumped from 16.8% to 51.8%. Finally, the Eastern District of
Oklahoma's departure rate skyrocketed from 5.0% to 20.4%. Compare U.S. SENTENCING
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standard matters little.
Perhaps appellate courts, having become
accustomed to scrutinizing departures closely, will continue that habit
regardless of the standard-of-review label. In the end, it is impossible to
know for sure how much this change will matter in practice.
III. CONGRESS'S DIRECTIVES TO THE SENTENCING COMMISSION

When Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, it
established the Sentencing Commission and gave it authority to promulgate
sentencing guidelines.46 Congress initially gave the Commission a few
specific instructions. For example, the Guidelines were to be neutral as to
race, sex, national origin, creed, and socioeconomic status.
They were
also to set penalties near the statutory maximus for three-time violent or
drug offenders. 48 By and large, however, the Sentencing Reform Act left it
to the Commission to craft specific guidelines language. The Commission
thereafter regularly proposed amendments to the Guidelines, and Congress
rejected a proposed amendment on only one occasion. 49 The point of the
system was to draw on the wisdom of federal judges and other
Commissioners. Congress usually deferred to their expertise while still
retaining ultimate political control and accountability.
Congress appears to have lost trust and patience with this process,
perhaps reflecting a loss of confidence in the Commission. Congress is no
longer leaving room for the Commission's expertise in drafting Guideline
language. The Feeney Amendment directly amends the following sections
of the Guidelines: 2G2.2 (child pornography), 2G2.4 (same), 3E1.1
(acceptance of responsibility), 4B 1.5 (repeat sex offenders against minors),
5H1.6 (community and family ties and responsibilities), 5K2.0
(unenumerated departures), 5K2.13 (diminished capacity), and 5K2.20
(aberrant behavior).50 The Feeney Amendment also inserts an entirely new

CIRCUIT & DISTRICT, OCTOBER 1,
1994, THROUGH SEPTEMBER 30, 1995, tbl.8, available at http://www.ussc.gov/judpack/
JP1995.htm, with U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS BY STATE,
CIRCUIT & DISTRICT, OCTOBER 1, 2000 THROUGH SEPTEMBER 30, 2001, tbl.8, available at
http://www.ussc.gov/judpack/JP2001.htm.
46 Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, § 217(a), 98 Stat. 2019 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §
994 (2003)).
47 Id. § 217(a), 98 Stat. 2019 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 994(d), (h)).
48 id.
49 That was the proposed amendment to eliminate the sentencing disparity between crack
and powder cocaine.
See David Yellen, Reforming Cocaine Sentencing: The New
Commission Speaks, 8 FED. SENTENCING REP. 54, 54 (1995).
50 PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(b)(3)-(5), (g), (i), 117 Stat. 650, 668
(2003).
COMM'N, FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS BY STATE,
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section 5K2.22 into the Guidelines, which limits departures based on age,
physical impairment, and addiction." It makes all of these amendments
effective immediately, regardless of whether the Sentencing Commission
has taken further steps to implement them.12 It forbids the Commission
ever to amend the acceptance-of-responsibility provision above or to reduce
the increased penalties for child pornography and child sex abuse. 3 And,
for the next two years, the amendment bars the Commission from creating
new departures or changing the amendment's restrictions on existing
grounds for departure. 4 Perhaps the biggest token of mistrust is that while
Congress used to require a minimum of three judges on the Commission, it
has changed that minimum to the maximum.5 5 Overall, what had been a
delegation of sentencing power to a trusted body of judicial experts has now
become a much shorter leash. The political branches certainly can exercise
this level of oversight, and oversight allays the concerns about excessive
delegation that cast doubt on the Guidelines' constitutionality. 56
Nonetheless, this sudden micromanagement suggests a breakdown in
Congress's working relationship with the Commission. Populist politics, it
seems, has lost patience with technocratic expertise and perceives it as too
soft on crime.
Congress will continue to use the Commission, but it seems intent on
giving more specific direction to achieve particular results. One provision
of the amendment in particular promises to have far-reaching consequences.
Section 401(m) directs the Commission to amend the Guidelines within 180
days "to ensure that the incidence of downward departures are [sic]
substantially reduced. 5 7 Though many of the other provisions are limited
to crimes involving sex or children, this one promises to affect all
sentencing.
One can only speculate about how the Commission will respond. To
substantially reduce departure rates, the most logical approach would
include taking on substantial-assistance departures.
As noted, these
departures have substantial costs as well as benefits and are used in over
one-sixth of cases.
Line prosecutors have incentives to overuse
I' § 401(b)(2), 117 Stat. at 668. This provision appears to be redundant, as it does no
Id.
more than reiterate the Guidelines' existing limitations on these departures.
"2Id. § 401(j)(1), (5), 117 Stat. at 673-74.
13 Id. § 401(j)(3), (4), 117 Stat. at 673.
14 Id. § 4010)(2), 117 Stat. at 673.
55 Compare § 401(n)(1), 117 Stat. at 676 (maximum of three), with 28 U.S.C. § 991(a)
(2001) (former minimum of three).
56 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372-79 (1989) (upholding the Guidelines
against a challenge under the non-delegation doctrine).
57 § 401(m), 117 Stat. at 675.
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cooperators, because prosecutors internalize the benefits of agreements
(more convictions) while externalizing the costs (reduced deterrence and
retribution, inequity, and possible perjury).
Though cooperation
agreements are essential tools for the prosecution, guideline amendments
could rein in their overuse. One possibility is to require supervisory
approval of cooperation agreements, because supervisors are better able to
see the systemic impact of individual prosecutorial decisions. Internal
prosecutorial regulations and procedures could also guide and constrain the
decision to sign up cooperators. A more innovative proposal is to budget
for each prosecutor's office a fixed number or percentage of defendants for
whom it can offer substantial-assistance agreements. This would force
prosecutors to limit agreements to the cases where they need them the
most.5 8
Unfortunately, these proposals are probably beyond the
Commission's power and would require Department of Justice action. But
the Commission could amend section 5K1.1 to require factual findings
about the need for and value of cooperation as prerequisites for sentence
reductions.
Probation officers could also compare the value of a
defendant's assistance with that of other defendants, insuring more
sentencing equity and counterbalancing prosecutors' dominant role in
valuing assistance.
The next most common reason for departures is "pursuant to plea
agreement." These departures account for 17.6% of non-substantialassistance downward departures, which is about 3.2% of all sentences.5 9
Some of these departures are departures on other grounds to which
prosecutors have agreed. Others are pursuant to Rule 11 (c)(1)(C) plea
agreements, which bind the court to impose a specific stipulated sentence. 60
Courts are currently split on whether this rule binds sentencing courts even
when it calls for sentences outside of the Guidelines range. 61 Congress
58 See Weinstein, supra note 32 (advancing this proposal).
59 See FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS, supra note 23, at tbl.25 (17.6% of nonsubstantial-assistance downward departures in fiscal year 2001); id. at fig.G (nonsubstantial-assistance downward departures were present in 18.3% of all sentences in fiscal
year 200 1).
60 FED. R. GRIM. P. 1 l(c)(1)(C) (formerly Rule I l(e)(1)(C)).
61 Compare United States v. Carrozza, 4 F.3d 70, 87-90 (1st Cir. 1993) (finding that the

Guidelines take precedence over a stipulated-sentence plea agreement, though on the facts
the error was not plain), Fields v. United States, 963 F.2d 105, 107-08 (6th Cir. 1992)
(finding that Guidelines take precedence over stipulated-sentence plea agreement), and
United States v. Kemper, 908 F.2d 33, 36-37 (6th Cir. 1990) (same), with United States v.
Goodall, 236 F.3d 700, 704-06 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (finding that a stipulated-sentence plea
agreement takes precedence over the Guidelines), United States v. Barnes, 83 F.3d 934, 94041 (7th Cir. 1996) (same), United States v. Mukai, 26 F.3d 953, 955-56 (9th Cir. 1994)
(same), United States v. Cunavelis, 969 F.2d 1419, 1422-23 (2d Cir. 1992) (same), United

STEPHANOS BIBAS

[Vol. 94

could reduce these departures by clarifying that the. Guidelines take
precedence over plea agreements.62 Alternatively, the Commission could
clarify that judges are not to accept these pleas until after they receive
presentence reports and verify that they are compatible with the Guidelines.
Right now, Guideline section 6B1.2 allows stipulated-sentence pleas that
"depart[] from the applicable guideline range for justifiable reasons. ' ' 63 The
Commission needs to make clear that "justifiable reasons" equal reasons
that would legally support a departure under the Guidelines.
The thrust of the Feeney Amendment, however, is directed at
unilateral judicial departures, not plea agreements or substantial assistance.
The Commission will probably take this hint, though it may address these
other topics as well. But no one ground predominates in unilateral judicial
departures. Instead, we have a few grounds that occur in about one to two
percent of all sentences: criminal history overrepresenting the defendant's
involvement, aberrant act, fast-track, and deportation. 64 The latter two
grounds will probably be subsumed within the new fast-track provision that
the Commission will draft. After this come a slew of reasons that occur in
fewer than one percent of all sentences each: family ties and
responsibilities, physical condition, diminished capacity, rehabilitation,
conduct outside the heartland of the Guideline, mental and emotional
condition, coercion, duress, age, et cetera.65 It is hard to know what the
Commission will do with these departures. Outright abolition would
probably be too crude. Tightening up on the standard of review, which the
Feeney Amendment already does, might have an impact. Apart from this,
expect a series of amendments that react to the departure case law and set
higher thresholds for departure.
For example, the current familycircumstances guideline gives little guidance and so has resulted in a

States v. Ruch, 906 F. Supp. 261, 263-64 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (same), and United States v.
Aguilar, 884 F. Supp. 88, 89 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (same, stating: "This case concerns one of a
large class of federal criminal prosecutions to which the Guidelines do not, as a practical
matter, apply-those disposed of by [stipulated-sentence] plea agreement.").
62 See John M. Dick, Note, Allowing Sentence Bargainsto FallOutside of the Guidelines
Without Valid Departures: It Is Time for the Commission to Act, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1017
(1997) (making this argument).
63 GUIDELINES MANUAL,

supra note 24, § 6B 1.2(c)(2).

64 See FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS, supra note 23 (reporting that criminal history

overrepresentation accounted for 11.9% of non-substantial-assistance downward departures,
isolated incident accounted for 7.9%, fast-track accounted for 7.7%, and deportation
accounted for 4.9% of these departures).
65 See id. (noting that each of the grounds in the text accounted for fewer than four
percent of all non-substantial-assistance downward departures).
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hodgepodge of inconsistent departure rulings.66 A revised guideline might
spell out that the mere presence of school-age children at home with a
single parent is not grounds for departure. Departures might still be
allowed for single parents who care for an infant or disabled child, where no
other relative is available as a substitute.
Perhaps a better solution is to codify these factors as downward
adjustments built into the Guidelines, as opposed to departures from the
Guidelines.
For the Guidelines' first decade, open-ended departure
provisions allowed judges to develop law case by case. This gradual
accretion of sentencing common law has had time to resolve the most
common sentencing situations. As a result, the Commission is now better
placed to codify the rules that have developed. The Commission seems to
have envisioned this eventual codification of common law. 67 As the
introduction to the Guidelines states: "By monitoring when courts depart
from the guidelines and by analyzing their stated reasons for doing so and
court decisions with references thereto, the Commission, over time, will be
able to refine the guidelines to specify
more precisely when departures
should and should not be permitted. 68 This codification will reduce the
downward departure rate by regularizing adjustments.
Indeed, the
conversion of fast-track departures into downward adjustments will by itself
have a dramatic effect on departure rates, cutting them nearly in half.69 This
conversion may look like an accounting gimmick, but converting departures
into adjustments will do some good. It will even out disparities due to
defense counsel's creativity and knowledge, the trial judge's idiosyncratic
willingness to depart, and the appellate court's stringency of review.
Published, codified adjustments have these advantages, though the
downside is that codified adjustments are more rigid and less nuanced than
departures.
In the end, though, the Feeney Amendment is a blunderbuss solution to
a narrower problem. The temperaments of a subset of judges still very
much affect sentences. Judge Jack Weinstein, for example, has written:
"[T]he Guidelines... have made charlatans and dissemblers of us all. We
spend our time plotting and scheming, bending and twisting, distorting and
6 Douglas A. Berman, Addressing Why: Developing PrincipledRationalesfor FamilyBased Departures, 13 FED. SENTENCING REP. 274 (2001).
67 On the need for common-law development of sentencing, see Douglas A. Berman, A

Common Law for this Age of Federal Sentencing: The Opportunity and Need for Judicial
Lawmaking, I I STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 93, 110 (1999).
68 GUIDELINES MANUAL,

supra note 24, at § IA.4(b).

69 When one excludes the border districts that use fast-track departures, the nonsubstantial-assistance departure rate drops from 18.3% to 10.2%. See 149 CONG. REC.
S5121 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 2003) (letter from U.S. Sentencing Commission).
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ignoring the law in an effort to achieve a just result. ' 70 This statement is
more true of certain judges, such as Judge Weinstein, than others. Stunning
disparities result from judges' differing proclivities "to achieve a just
result" by "twisting, distorting and ignoring the law."'', By thumbing their
noses at the law, these willful judges provoke prosecutors to seek more
restrictions. The problem, though, is that the new restrictions apply just as
much to the faithful judges as they do to the willful. Searching appellate
review is a measured way of keeping wayward judges in line, but the
elimination of departures altogether will constrain good judges more than
bad. Judges who conscientiously follow the law will have even less
discretion after Feeney, but these are the judges who least need to be reined
in. Judges who admit to "bending and twisting, distorting and ignoring the
law" will probably distort the facts to get around the Feeney Amendment.
The law can only do so much to check judges who are bent on finding ways
to depart. In short, those who most need to be constrained are the most
difficult to constrain. Where there is a will, there is often a way to
sentencing disparity. Feeney may put a dent in this disparity but will not
eliminate it.
IV. CONCLUSION

The Feeney Amendment marks a dramatic break from the past. Up
until now, the Commission has used its expertise to formulate sentencing
rules and leave room for judges to develop a body of departure
jurisprudence. Now, Congress has lost faith in the Commission. It has
decided to rein in its delegation of power on a much shorter leash and to
cabin and codify departures. The politics of being tough on crime trumps
the Commission's technocratic expertise. The obvious result is more rules
and fewer unilateral judicial departures. The less obvious result is a transfer
of even more plea-bargaining power from judges to prosecutors, resulting in
higher sentences on prosecutors' terms. Departures will still happen when
prosecutors agree to them, as there is no way to stop them when no party
will appeal. The big question mark is how the Commission will go about
fulfilling Congress's mandate to reduce downward departures substantially.
I hope that the Commission will check prosecutors as well as judges, say by
tightening up on substantial-assistance motions and stipulated-sentence plea
agreements. If instead it restricts only trial judges' discretion while leaving
prosecutors alone, it will skew the already lopsided balance of power even
more.
70

Jack B. Weinstein, A Trial Judge's Second Impression of the Federal Sentencing

Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 357, 365 (1992).
71 Id.

